A refusal to extend $25 billion in bridge loans to Ford, Chrysler, and GM could have catastrophic consequences for the economy similar to those experienced after the failure of Lehman Brothers. In mid-September of this year, you’ll remember, Treasury refused to loan Lehman any capital or to offer a line of credit to any purchaser of Lehman as the Federal Reserve had offered to J.P. Morgan Chase in its purchase of Bear Stearns in March. When Treasury walked away from offering support, first Bank of America and then Barclays walked away. Lehman was doomed. And so, it seems, was the economy. Credit markets tightened; commercial paper contracted; banks refused to loan to other banks, not trusting that they’d be paid back; Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch; Treasury bailed out AIG; and Congress finally agreed to provide another $700 billion to rescue the financial system. Lehman’s failure triggered a crisis in the financial system worldwide. All of this is laid out in The Financial Times in an excellent article entitled “The Lehman legacy: Catalyst of the crisis.”
In hindsight, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson should have offered guarantees similar to those that enabled the purchase of Bear Stearns. If he had done so, perhaps the present liquidity crisis could have been avoided or, at the least, been put off another few weeks or months. Except for giving more time to fix the mess, it’s questionable what putting the disaster off another few weeks would have accomplished. But where are we now? Sinking into a liquidity trap with the possibility of a deflation spiral on the horizon. And if you’re bailing out Bear Stearns and AIG and then pumping capital into a long list of banks from the $700 billion, wouldn’t guaranteeing the capital that Bank of America or Barclay’s would have used to purchase Lehman have been worth it?
Now Secretary Paulson seems squeamish about aiding Detroit, pleading that the $700 billion approved by Congress did not authorize him to rescue the three automakers. The Secretary, however, also isn’t using the money to buy banks’ toxic assets, which was the whole basis of his proposal to Congress to thaw credit markets. Once again, the Secretary hesitates in rewarding companies who’ve miscalculated markets, certainly an understandable apprehension in a free market economy. Moral hazard is not an empty concept.
The problem, however, is that failing to rescue such firms may put the whole system at risk as appears to have happened with the failure of Lehman. Systemic risks may not only inhabit financial firms. In fact, the subsequent credit freeze and lack of confidence has directly affected automakers, foreign and domestic. The purchase of autos requires credit, and banks simply aren’t lending on terms that most people can afford. It’s hard to blame the banks; they don’t have the confidence as yet that they’ll be paid back. But what will happen to confidence if Detroit is allowed to fail?
Be wary of those like Mitt Romney, who advocate the Russian Roulette of Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the three firms. No one likes the fact that the three are being saved from their own faulty decisions of the past, but to allow one or more of them to go under presents a systemic risk that the country may never recover from. The spiral of deflation that could result would be an absolute catastrophe. If you think we’re in a crisis of confidence now, wait until these three go under. You’ll see a lack of confidence in American leadership and institutions that will have worldwide ramifications.
Image of Treasury building courtesy of drstout’s photostream at Flickr and used under license of Creative Commons.

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